Brilliant podcast commenting on the push factors which drive art evaluation
Why do I find this image worrying – I do not find it beautiful yet everybody else does.
Brilliant podcast commenting on the push factors which drive art evaluation
Why do I find this image worrying – I do not find it beautiful yet everybody else does.
This blog is a notebook for me to record statements around the issues:
is it art?
what is art?
if it is art, is it good art?
What is good art?
Why do people do things that we/they call artBecause it is my own blog and notebook, I reserve the right to be incoherent and disorganized. Having said that, I welcome comments that further the enquiry from people who can tolerate this.
listening to the podcast idea struck me about what happens when we communicate our experience of art – crudely: it seems to be a discourse which is outside normal rules of interaction ie relies much more on the specific experience of the interlocutor in order to make sense – ie it does not rely on true/false factual, falsifiable/ observable truth but relies on whether the interlocutor has had the same or comparable experience inside his/her head and not externalised as a sharable experience that can be talked about. ie the woman literary critic is talking about her experience of reading a book called ‘eat the buddha’ and she says: ‘WHEN I finished it, I did not know where I was for about five minutes, you know’ the other book critic on the programme says ‘I love that feeling’
she says this in the context of reviewing a book in the context of evaluating the book. she uses a very subjective experience she had as a sign of quality in the book. the other critic acknowledges not the book itself but the feeling she uses in order to assess whether the book is good or not. so he validates the criterion she uses. she goes on to say that it is not a common experience for her as a professional book reader who is always aware of themselves reading but in this case she completely submitted to the book. I think this is a very relevant exchange in terms of ‘how do we evaluate art – ie that the evaluation of art inevitably means exchanging opinions on the work to other people but those opinions arise from internal experiences that are not falsifiable objectively (ie we cannot say it is false) but only endorsed (not unendorsed) by people who have had the same experience. So art criticism is of its very nature exclusive of some people
there is an underlying assumption behind all the theories, namely that quality judgments about the work of art can be performed by set formal principles regardless of space, time and context
WHAT DEFINES A GOOD WORK OF ART WITHIN THE CONTEMPORARY ART WORLD? THEORIES, PRACTICES AND INSTITUTIONS
there is an underlying assumption behind all the theories, namely that quality judgments about the work of art can be performed by set formal principles regardless of space, time and context
|I use Bourdieu’s concept of habitus as well as the Kantian idea of pure aesthetic experience in order to demonstrate that it is the educated elite who decide what good and or bad art is. These decisions are not only exclusivist within the art world, but they also exclude social classes other than the elite from the art world|
Fischer argues that good art can only be made under Communist circumstances. For him good art is the coming together of form and content, the representation of the Communist ideology; art is messianic.
|Adorno or Benjamin are more pessimistic, but come to the same messianic conclusions (Benjamin 1936). Both argue that art has to be taken back to its original place and function and should fulfill its original role, namely ritual.||In answering these questions the art world hides behind the concept of ‘good works of art’, and it seems as if this category is a given. A work sells well because it is good, an artist becomes famous because s/he is good, a work is exhibited because it is good. But what constitutes a good work of art within the contemporary art world?|
|For this new art world, formalist principles could no longer apply, art had become an idea, it was dematerialised. Artists started to consciously focus on meaning and content; art had either become critical of art itself or socially critical.|
|The exploration of modernist concepts such as taste is introduced in Chapter two. Following on formalism and the museum as institution, it was the modernist construct of high taste, which determined what was considered to be a good work of art.||Ranciere’s theory, namely that an art project is good if, in the realm of the aesthetic, it creates space for questions and generates change and hope for a better future (Bishop 2006:179-183).|
Along with critics of the art market such as Jane Kallir, I will demonstrate how prices do not reflect quality, as prices are created and established through promotion and marketing (Kallir 2007).
|due to the mechanisms of the art market, issues such as reproducibility, high show-value, and the satisfaction of certain trends are just as important, if not more important than quality (Kallir 2007).
modernist theories and the modernist museum: from 18 century onwards these are the foundation of modernist art criticism – today ideas are modernist or try to fight modernism with pluralism
formalist theorists is important, as despite the diversity of their ideas, there is an underlying assumption – a commonality – behind all their theories, namely that there are set formal standards that we can apply to works of art regardless of the context and the content of the work and that quality judgments can be made according to formalist standards. The good work of art that is the creation of the detached artistic genius evokes the Kantian pure aesthetic experience which is then given access to and honoured within the cultural morays which define high culture.
the genius =
one of the foundations of modernist art theory
above the ordinary creative or mental abilities.
e Jena Group, Weimar
theorists in 18th century northern-Europe. Emerging parallel with Romanticism, the Jena Group in Weimar, considered to be the first avant-garde group, introduced the new artistic persona, namely the (pure) ‘artist messiah’ who was seen as another face of the genius (Taylor 1992:32).
the role of the artist is transformed into that of a messiah, his task being to guide people towards the supernatural.
As stated above, good works of art are therefore created to represent the truth and to lead humankind to happiness and ultimately to enlightenment
the same attitude was adopted by modernist artists as well. The significant influence of the messiah-attitude also made its mark on modern art, and the avant-garde of the late 19th, early 20thcentury adopted this view as well.
Cubism, for example, wanted to show the abstract geometric reality behind the reality of appearances, Futurism, with its spiritual cleansing and industrial enlightenment theories became almost the state art of fascist Italy. Malevich stated that God was the end, the source and end of all light and depicted it in his Black Square (1915)
If we look at the theories demonstrated above, it becomes clear that the point where they connect with each other is at the saviour-role of the artist and the superiority of the work of art, created by the genius, or by the ‘artist-messiah’. The good work of art is the work that guides people towards God, as it becomes the tool of the new religion.
The ideal of the genius was re-introduced during the Renaissance4, and became a focal point of 18th century art criticism.
Rousseau and Diderot romanticised the ideal of the Renaissance artist.
The genius which could be either seen as the ‘artist messiah’, or simply as an exceptional talent soaring above the constraints of the human mind and language, creates the foundations of the theories of formalism.
He argues that aesthetic judgments are subjective due to the difference in individual taste, but at the same time taste commands universal agreement, as a beautiful object gives pleasure to everyone. Beauty, therefore, has to be universal somehow
impure aesthetic judgments, which depend on likes and dislikes, therefore they are seen as completely subjective
pure aesthetic judgments which are also based on feelings but they claim universal validity.
how can feelings claim universal validity if they are embedded in the subject and not in the object?
answer according to Kant is that pure aesthetic judgments are disinterested, meaning they can be objective and subjective at the same time
are not comparative, meaning that we cannot have expectations towards how the object should be or look like. –
one takes Mona Lisa or the sea for what it is
the ontological nature of the aesthetic object is not relevant:
the only truly disinterested judgment is the judgment “X is beautiful” where the nature of X is not considered at all.
Kant’s theory was the ideal starting point for formalism, which promoted the concept of art for art’s sake. The creation of the work of art is purposive art without a purpose, meaning that art is self-referential. The artist makes art with the intention of making art only, she/he does not make art in order to, for 22
example, express a message or evoke social change, but art-making for the sake of art itself.
formalist critics: Wolfflin, clive Bell, Roger Fry, Kenneth Clarke, Clement Greenberg,
Clive Bell 1181-1964
Bell argued that works of art provoke different emotions yet they belong to a certain group of emotions, which he identified as (the Kantian) aesthetic emotion. Should we find a common quality in the works of art, which provokes this emotion, the central problem of aesthetics would be solved.
should be some quality within a work of art with its combinations of line and colour, which is aesthetically moving. This quality and the fusion of 25
line and colour into a specific form, Bell identified as the ‘significant form’ which is common to all visual art. These significant forms are the carriers of the aesthetic experience.
But finding significant form within contemporary works is just as difficult as it is to follow Wölfflin’s ideas. Moreover, Bell never explained clearly what significant form really was and neither did Roger Fry, who resorted to mysticism when there was a need for explanation. They both commenced with empiricism, but when concepts such as subjectivity and feeling needed explanation, we are left with controversial answers such as taking art to spiritual heights (Lang 1962:169
He believed in the hierarchy and domination of superior art, rejected popular art movements, and looked upon the artistic tradition as a change of styles which manifest the works of the artistic genius.
The one artistic style which he put on a pedestal was Abstract Expressionism. Its timeless quality, the ignorance of subject matter, lack of figuration, the focus on only two dimensions and its self-referential aspect, were the ideal points for formalist critique. Abstract Expressionism was also seen as the allegory of high art, which was understood and accessed only by art professionals. G
Greenberg, along with Michael Fried, are considered to be the last great modernist critics, the last heroic protectors of high art and formalism.
the answers regarding what defined good art were straighforward: the artist was identified as the genius, who created an eternal masterpiece, independent from content and context, the quality of the work was foremost in the work. The work itself could be mapped and uncovered by the practiced eye which was open to the ideal (significant) form.
The modernist museum – its role and criticism
In terms of fine art, the museum legitimised the underlying rules of formalist criticism. The pieces, which were displayed in the museum were considered by theoreticians to be masterpieces, and in return, the museum ensured the masterpiece status of the work through museum practices
the modernist museum colluded with the Kantian theory of aesthetics. Its goal was to legitimise the detached superior status of the artist and to save the arts from the lowly art market by ensuring their display within this structure of high culture.
the ultimate goal of an artist was to be displayed in a museum
it was proclaimed by the cultural elite (and touted by the museum itself) as an institution for the preservation and protection of high culture.
it advertised and promoted national cultural wealth as well as a nation’s enriched cultural heritage
but there are problems with the museum:
an old broken seashell, a painting by Mark Rothko, an Egyptian statue made for ritual or a conceptual installation by Kosuth, can all be found in the very same museum, displayed in a very similar manner where, there is no differentiation (1990:28).
We do not have access to the works as their context and content remain hidden from us, and since we now only have the visual object to deal with, we can only appreciate the works for their visual attributes. This is where the viewer falls into the trap of formalism
If all objects are forced into the same system of judgment, namely formalism, they lose their original meaning.
As the above example demonstrates, judging all works of art for their formal attributes destroys the intrinsic meaning of the work of art.
If meaning is destroyed, how are we able to make proper judgements about the quality of a piece of art?
Since the museum is not able to step out of its historical legacy of modernist judgments, it enforces its formalist attitude onto all kinds of art, it expands the theory onto all kinds of objects, suffocates them in formalism, ignores their context and meaning, and therefore it does not give leeway for other possible judgments on quality.
|the art market cannot be taken as a reliable agency of adjudication.
The concept of the genius is an acknowledgement that we as viewers or lay public cannot understand what art is.
the genius becomes the basis of Kant’s theory of the artist creator, the academically educated genius,
the ‘artist messiah’ behind the great works of art for the Jena Group or for the formalists.
artists, who were placed in a realm above society, were going to show the path to the spiritual or transcendental.
aiming towards the perfect order which was already present in nature, but that we fail to see it as we are corrupted by industrialisation and urbanisation
Kandinsky with his geometric abstract work wanted to show the path to a new spiritual kingdom, which
Le Corbusier was designing his buildings in the name of the White World where pure forms guide us to a better, spiritually clean society (Taylor 1992:83,113).
De Stijl, illustrated similar ideas in their art and architecture.
Mondrian painted his works in order to map the transcendental reality through basic geometric shapes and colours p16
Both the artists of the Renaissance and artists of the following eras had to satisfy the taste of the ruling class, artistic liberty was limited by the taste of the commissioner
They argued that true values, both social and artistic, had evaporated from 18th century culture due to the emergence of luxury states. The art of the 17th and 18th centuries repulsed these philosophers who were convinced that the role of art was to portray true human qualities, therefore they argued heavily against the art market and luxury states which favoured ‘kitsch’ as opposed to true or intrinsic quality pictured by the artist-messiah (Mattick 2003:32,3
By ignoring everything besides form, the early followers of formalism believed in the eternal nature and relevance of a work of art, claiming that the only aspect which mattered, was that art was made for art’s 19
sake, the work was always self-referential, as it was seen as a unique entity in the world, detached from all other objects and thought
the work of art is independent even from its maker
but not from the genius of the maker
Art is also independent from society
no need for special training to understand a work of art, or trained eyes with specialised schooling
formalism destroys the bourgeois privilege of art enjoyment
formalism had put high art up on the pedestal, made it universal, unique and detached it from the practical or other theoretical aspects of life.
formalism rose out of the aesthetic theory of Immanuel Kant
Kant excludes all other 21
considerations such as practical, moral or personal gratification from the aesthetic” (Wilkinson 2004:80).
Thus, art for Kant, has no functional or moral value
it ignores the personality of the artist, but argues that works of art are born through the artistic genius, the same artistic genius as explained by Agamben. The artistic genius is able to grasp the pure universal aesthetic experience in order to channel universal beauty.
independent from society, independent from the monetary system, distanced from objects in use. The work of art is therefore an end in itself.
a strict methodological framework for the understanding of artworks and the identification of what a good work of art should be or look like.
linear versus painterly, plane versus recession, closed versus open, multiplicity versus unity, absolute versus relative clarity, provide a very detailed and rational analysis of works of art
Wölfflin, like Riegl, followed a Hegelian model in which he argued that the spirit of each period or time frame determines artistic creation. The artwork is determined by the temperament of the individual, the nation and the period
also able to make quality judgments through this methodological framework.
Wölfflin’s methodological framework can no longer stand as a foundation for judgments regarding contemporary pieces
roger fry 1866-1934
both bell and fry believed in significant form being connected to aesthetic exerience
a good artwork consisted of the playful coming together of the rhythm of lines, mass of bodies, space, light, shade and colour
Kenneth Clark (1939: xiii) writes in the introduction of Last Lectures as follows: “Post-Impressionism brought to a point Fry’s growing conviction that the literary element in painting, its dramatic or associative content, was aesthetically insignificant. It led him for the first time to entertain the idea of an art depending for its effect solely on the relations of forms and colours, irrespective of what those forms or colours might represent.”
chapter 2 from kantian high taste to marxist criticism
Who decides the difference between good and bad art?
look at the theoretical base for ‘taste’ and who those individuals are who have a taste for art, what social position they hold and what motivates them to become judges and judgemental.
the high and low taste concept, based on the Kantian pure aesthetic experience. This is an elitist view that can also be connected to the modernist museum.
Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) who was a Marxist theorist who argued that high taste was constructed by the ruling aristocratic elite, that it was nothing else but a social construct which had to be deconstructed
Kant is the start of high v low art and art v craft
pure aesthetic experience
For Kant, everything that falls outside of the pure aesthetic experience is considered to be secondary, subjective, and therefore derogatory.
Art should be associated with free play without any other purpose.
diderot and rousseau also had the distinction between good and bad art
18thcentury French criticism by Diderot and Rousseau also deals with the same problem.
during 18thc market began to expand this meant that
public taste started to influence artistic production. In order to make a living, the artist was forced to satisfy the low taste, petit gout of the public. subject matters and styles became associated with good or bad art some artists tried to combine both eg chard and greuze
The elite and the formation of taste
the author implies that taste is fleeting and has little reality and speaks about abstract expressionist painters in Hungary today who sell to americans
vekony says that artists
artists are made to follow given trends. Necessarily, within a trend good and bad works could be executed. Who are the people who decide which trend to favour and what is good within that trend?
the majority of the art world professionals come from educated, middle-class or aristocratic circles
The ability to see and judge via the grand gout was practiced by the privileged as it was seen to belong to the ruling class. In this sense, judgements of taste did not only classify the work of art, but also classified the people who were capable of making these judgments (Mattick 2003:
Bourdieu calls habitus
“Habitus creates a class identity in the form of a unified practice of classification, as choices are made.
taste classifies the classifier; because in a class society all distinction has status implications
As art, following the formalist direction and Kantian philosophy, is not about function but about form, not about work but about play, it is for the privileged. It is for those who do not want to dirty their hands. So the circle closes and the idea behind art creates certain social practices and in return these practices keep the idea alive. From this social class the artistic elite is born; ones who are seemingly under the spell of the work of art but in reality they control the art market and the artist. In the case of contemporary art the situation is even more complex because of the diverse arenas of art, where the artist is subjected to the personal taste of judgment-makers and to the trends and fashions of the artistic elite.2 p43
dd says a pattern is defined by the quality of giving a better chance than 50-50 of what is coming next (pat says maybe has pleasure giving attributes because enabled better prediction of the environment and so better survival chances
these thoughts struck me as I began to follow the course above:
Okay, so here’s an example. Suppose I’m looking at an apple, and I can recognize that it’s an apple. You might think that’s kind of obvious, of course you can recognize it, but not everyone can. There are people with brain damage who can’t recognize simple objects anymore. So what… There’s actually a miraculous thing happening in our brains when we see an apple on the table and recognize it as an apple and not something else. We…
0:33:09 SS: Think about what’s involved. You have specialized neurons that detect color, there are others that are looking at shape, there are some that are thinking about other qualities of the apple, and we somehow put all those different qualities together to recognize one whole coherent object, the apple. And what you observe in the brain when that’s happening is that the parts of the brain that are noticing color are actually firing electrically at the same frequency as the parts that are noticing shape or whatever. So synchronous oscillation is the brain’s way of, the biologists call it the binding problem. How do you bind all the different features of an object into a coherent single object to recognize that it’s not just a bunch of different things happening in your brain all at once?
0:33:56 SC: Interesting, so it’s not just that there’s a part of my brain saying I’m seeing something red and another part saying I’m seeing something apple-shaped, but they’re saying it in synchrony with each other and somehow that lets the brain or conscious perception say that is an apple.
0:34:11 SS: Yeah, and it says that, right, exactly. Those separate things that are all oscillating in sync are all… Meanwhile, other parts of the brain that are not paying attention or that are thinking about, or interested in other aspects, they’re out of sync and so they’re ignored. It’s the brain’s way of telling itself what’s all part of one object, or one sensation. And this is… Go ahead.
The binding problem. (A) The brain processes the visual attributes of objects (color, motion, shape) in different pathways or regions, and it is generally believed that there must therefore be neural mechanisms that ‘bind‘ this information to generate coherent perceptual experience.
This site is my spielraum. I hope I have not got this wrong but from what I remember, Schiller’s thought the spielraum was a contained area where social rules could be modified. I have to go back and read again. In the meantime, I am aware that writing this might hurt the maker of the work. I am reassured by the thought that the maker will never see this. I am also reassured (though on more shaky ground) by an intimation that it is important to think and say these things. I also offer this as mitigation of what might be seen as rudeness: maybe there is some fault in me that leads me to disagree with what so many people say and maybe I can find out what that fault is by looking at what is going on.
Note to readers who find this online:
This This conversation was held at Cork Caucus, Cork, Ireland, 2005, and published in Cork
Caucus: On Art, Possibility, and Democracy ([Cork]: National Sculpture Factory and
Revolver, 2006), 247–59. This is a partly edited version; the definitive version is in Cork
The book that’s mentioned here is Why Art Cannot be Taught. Several sections of it are free
online on the site https://saic.academia.edu/JElkins/Papers.
Why art cannot be taught – James Elkins
Editor: Never one to shirk from discussing the most controversial topics, at times
bordering on the politically incorrect, (and) yet with an undeniable capacity for
generating serious conversation, here – trying to burst one of the principal bubbles of
the Caucus itself – the widely published author and Professor, James Elkins,
broaches the prickly subjects of why art can’t be taught, nor reduced to merely talk.
In conversation with several local artists and international participants, he supports
his argument by reference to literary criticism, through recourse to the Kantian
origins of critique, and finally by focusing his claim on the difficulties encountered in
the so-called crit (critique) session. That the conversation deteriorates to a minor
pitched battle – in the garden of the Convent which housed the Caucus Centre – for
art being “very, very rational” on the one hand and “ninety-nine percent irrational” on
the other, we find productive for making plain once again, the caesura parameters of
the middle section of the book.
James Elkins: When Tara asked me to do something I thought a reasonable thing to
do that doesn’t get discussed much in the art world is basically talk about how hard it
is to talk about art. And by that I mean the strangeness of the art work, the fact that
it’s visual, the fact that it tends to be something that doesn’t fit very easily with ways
that people talk. So I had this notion that we would talk about two things in particular
that make art really, really hard to address: one of them is; why art can’t be taught
and the other subject is how hard it is to talk about art in critique settings, or
critiques. About half of the book I wrote called Why Art Can’t Be Taught actually ends
up being about critiques, because critiques are, I think, one thing that sets what we
do apart from stuff that gets done in most other, if not all other, fields that would be
taught in colleges and universities. I know some people sort of deny that; they would
say that art is something that you can talk about in the way that you talk about
physics or chemistry, that you get better at it and so on. The fact is that no other field
in universities or colleges, has critiques for its examination system. If you are a
physics student, you don’t get freewheeling conversation at the end of the teaching
period, with your adviser and then they decide, OK, you’re ready for the next year.
You get questions, serious questions. But for some reason, it doesn’t work that way
One of the things to conclude from that is that art doesn’t have a step-wise set of
things you can learn to go from one stage to another. Nobody can agree what that
might be in art. It can’t go that way, it has to go through these conversations that end
up being called critiques. The second subject would concern how conversations
about art are irrational. And my own take on this is that an art school critique, or a
serious kind of conversation about art, is just about the most irrational thing you can
do and still be speaking right. I think they are about ninety-nine percent irrational, but
it is possible to figure out some things about them and to try to keep a bit of control
over them and that’s what I end up writing about in the book. The question is a
practical one, for how in the world do you make sense out of what’s happened when
you’ve had a critique.
I have a little list of reasons why I think critiques don’t make sense: a list of eleven.
These would be things to fight against. So, in my classes I wouldn’t say to anybody ‘I
like that, that’s good, that’s bad’, but the conversation is about the conversation. How
do you talk about art, how have people talked about your art in the past, what kind of
things have they said, have they made any sense, could they have made more
sense, would there be a way to make some sense out of them? In my class in
Chicago what we do – and I’ve taped a bunch of critiques and typed out the
transcripts – is to slow them way down by reading them. Of all the different
suggestions that I have to improve art conversations, that’s the best one I think.
The first one of eleven is that nobody knows what an art critique is, as opposed to
other kinds of critiques. The thing to know about the history of critiques is that the
word comes out of the Kantian critique, and what Immanuel Kant meant by a critique
was completely different from what anybody these days means by critique. A critique
in his way of thinking was ‘an inquiry which tells you the limits of your thinking’. It’s
not to judge, it’s to find how far you can think, where you have to stop. This kind of
critique is in the background of what we call critiques, but obviously something
fundamental has changed because, in what we call critiques, the point is to judge. If
you do a pure Kantian critique you don’t judge.
In the eighties there was a movement in the art world to try to turn critiques into the
old fashioned critique. An art critic’s job was supposedly not to judge anything but
only to understand the conditions of their judgment, to understand what is was that
led them to make judgments. That was a movement in post-structuralism and of
course it doesn’t work, because you can’t encounter an art work and say nothing
about it except why it is you feel you might want to judge it. That’s too much navel
gazing. So if critiques have something to do with judgment and not just the Kantian
sense of figuring out the limitations on your own thinking, then the question is ‘well,
what are the terms of judgment’ – so you have then a wide-open field of possibilities.
Take an example at hand. In the convent, presumably you would have religious or
ethical judgments that you would be after. In some philosophic settings you would
have critiques where the point would be moral judgments. You could have critiques
in education settings where the point is pedagogic judgments. The problem with art
world critiques is that nobody knows what the terms of judgement are. I think there
might be some agreement that we don’t want to just say that the work is good or bad
although that would be a perfectly legitimate kind of judgment. And there might be
some agreement that we don’t want to say that the work is beautiful or not, but that’s
a classical Kantian aesthetic judgment so that’s a legitimate kind of thing but the art
world doesn’t do much of that either. At least in Chicago my students are totally
allergic to beauty; they don’t want to be told their work is beautiful, its like being told
its kitsch, its bad or its useless. So then, if we’re also going to have no aesthetic
criteria, no judgment of beauty, we’re left with a really strange bunch of terms for our
judgments and the most interesting one is the word “interesting.”
When somebody says to you that your work is really interesting, as far as I’m
concerned anyway, this means nothing. It‘s like a placeholder; I will say add to this in
a moment. That’s a kind of art world evasiveness, it’s not really quite a judgment yet,
it’s like a pseudo-judgment. And you could make a little list of these: powerful, that’s
always a good thing to say. Who doesn’t want their work to be powerful, but then
again, exactly what does that mean? Authentic, your work is authentic, which means
what? It’s a good thing you’re not a sham! Moving, your work is moving, but what
does it say, why is it moving, what is it moving about? Inventive and original are sort
of avant-garde criteria. Difficult, that’s another avant-garde one, But then as with the
others, the content of the judgment is missing. In my mind they’re all connected with
the fundamental one of interesting, because they are all more or less content free.
You would have to then go on and ask what made them that way, and interesting is
good for social reasons because if someone says your work is interesting, one thing
that they might mean is that they don’t want to turn around immediately and run
away. They are willing to stay there and look at it a little while, so interesting also
means something might happen later, that the work will keep them there somehow.
Maud Cotter: I think it’s interesting when it prompts you to see things differently in it,
when it opens other perceptual possibilities…if I use that word about somebody’s
work it’s because it makes me see the world in a different way.
James: If a person says it is honest, it can be totally dishonest if you hate the work
and because you can’t say that, you say ‘oh that’s interesting’. It can also be
passively dishonest if you can’t think of anything else to say but the honest
interesting, I think it is like that, it means that something’s happened which you don’t
know how to put into words yet.
Maud: It is a hovering kind of a word too. It allows you to suspend judgment.
(Maud took out rest of this piece)
Tara: It’s a waiting stage, a willingness to engage.
James: Or, to defer judgment.
Maud: Sometimes if you see something that has had an effect on you, it has to go
down and come back up the next day. Its maybe only a day or two later you get
Tom Curtin: Maybe you’re just waiting to see what everyone else has to say first.
James: A question of holding back. I think in a social situation, with friends and
visiting a studio, I think interesting would probably be honest. In a school situation, in
my experience, interesting is usually dishonest, because one of the things that art
students don’t always realise, is that if you have an instructor who’s over the age of
thirty/thirty five, they’ve probably seen work like yours a lot before. If you have an
instructor that’s pushing up towards sixty they’ve certainly seen what you’re doing
before, and so one of the challenges for art instructors is to try to be enthusiastic,
engaged, polite and all the rest of that, and ‘interesting’ is really handy for that .
Jan Verwoert: I hate to sound like a critic here, but I think that ‘interesting’ comes into
art critical discourse at a very precise point in the history of aesthetic discourse, the
beginning of the nineteenth century, and the terms ‘interesting’ versus ‘boring’ mark a
very significant transition from an older vocabulary of what was ‘beautiful’ and not
‘ugly,’ which was the Classical aesthetic where art is believed to be a manifestation
of natural beauty. It appears first with Friedrich Schlegel. It’s a shift in aesthetics from
the Classical to the Modern, where the new paradigm is exactly what you have said:
that art is no longer primarily judged in terms of whether it articulates natural beauty
but whether it touches us. To speak about the interesting and the boring in a sense
confirms that you have entered the modern age. I don’t find anything phony about it.
It is the primary judgment operative in modernity and there is nothing wrong about
James: I agree with you half way. I think the history is exactly right and the whole
history of what counts as boring is also a very interesting thing. I would just be a little
bit careful about saying that it’s not phony, because there are so many terms of
judgment, not just the aesthetic turn to the Romantic, not just the turn to Modernism
as you say, but there are so many other terms, the ethical, pedagogical and all the
rest of these terms and they get mixed up in art critiques so much that it can be
messier than you suggest. You see, I’m not disagreeing with you, but it seems to me
that it doesn’t solve the problems that actually come up in art conversation. There
can be all kinds of reasons why someone uses this word and its many synonyms
and false friends, as they say. I think there is a kind of flora and fauna of judgment,
but you’re absolutely right that, if you trace it historically, you do have that moment in
which that turn takes place and I think you could find at least one or two others. You
could talk about a turn in the Renaissance from a theological truth to a secular truth
– something Derrida does.
Jan: I would just say that, in very pragmatic terms, these words are a port of entry
into the discourse of modern art. It’s the tools we have and they haven’t been
replaced yet so we can’t help using them. After that, you have to give reasons, and
people can check whether you are talking bullshit or not. It’s just a way to open up a
discourse, it’s a gesture, and afterwards, what you say has to be verified in relation
to the object and then everything becomes very rational because everyone will be
able to see whether you talk nonsense or not. Whether what you are saying makes
sense in relation to the object.
James: Now you are beginning to sound like a high-modernist.
Sarah Iremonger: Yes, does that not open the possibility of intellectual snobbery?
Jan: No, everybody can check. It’s very democratic, everybody with an aversion to
bullshit will be in a position to judge what you say.
Maud: But doesn’t a language bend and evolve to suit everybody’s individual
aesthetic? I think in some ways, being an artist and finding a way of talking about
your work is about forging a language around your work, making it an individual
space. But while there is the personal aesthetic, there is the grammatical almost
structured way that you are talking. I am beginning to believe less and less in things
that exist as they are, and more and more in the complete relativity of everything. I
can’t say that I’d be thrilled to systematise my thinking in any way. I think the only
way of finding a way forward is to somehow evolve a personal language and then
maybe get that challenged.
James: One of the things that happened in the last twenty years or so in criticism is
the appearance of locutions of the sort; ‘my work addresses this, my work opens this
question, my work interrogates, my work explores, my work unpacks’ (one of my
favourites), or ‘I can’t unpack this now’ (the academic version). If you look at these
things when they come up in art writing, usually nothing follows. It doesn’t say what it
is that is actually being explored. You say ‘my work explores gender relations’ but
what was the content of that exploration? So again, without saying that I disagree
with this, it’s the forms of it that matters and there’s something new about that
particular coyness that wasn’t there before, although it’s in the same historical fold
Since you brought up this genealogy, (would read better as – ‘since this genealogy
has been brought up,) I have a little list here of four different kinds of critical
orientations from the literary critic, M.H. Abrams. In the forties he wrote a book called
The Mirror and the Lamp, which is still a fundamental book on literary theory and
literary criticism. The first of four different orientations of criticism is mimetic, and for
him that means that you judge an artist’s work according to how well it matches
nature. The second one is pragmatic criticism, criticism intended to help the artist
please, delight, move or instruct. Pragmatic instruction would be a way of helping
people to get their work in the world, have it speak more effectively.
The third is what he calls expressive. That is criticism intended to help the person to
make the work be more expressive. That is a romantic idea. The last critical
orientation is what he calls objective criticism. That is when the person who’s doing
the talking is trying to talk only about the work. In the art world this is usually called
formal criticism, although that would be technically a little bit different. Objective
criticism is when you pretend for the purposes of conversation that there’s nothing
outside the art – that the art is all you’re talking about, its form and structure, its
composition. Abrams says that these four, the mimetic, the pragmatic, the expressive
and the objective, constitute the field of criticism. I think the last one of those is a
fiction; there’s no way to talk just about an artwork without bleeding into these other
kinds of critique. That can be helpful, because what tends to happen is that people
quickly veer from one to another in ordinary conversation so fast and in such a
confused way that the task becomes whether you can tease them apart.
The second reason why critiques are difficult is they are often too short. I think it
would be reasonable to say that when you step into someone’s studio for the first
time and you see the work, unless you know what to expect, it’s going to take you at
least five to ten minutes just to get your bearings, and then at least another twenty
minutes to ask pertinent questions and you’re probably not going to run out of
questions for half an hour or an hour, at the minimum. So for me, ten or fifteen
minutes is not enough to do anything except to start to formulate the questions that
you want to ask about the thing.
Tara: Are you aware of Static’s project as part of Cork Caucus? It’s called
EXITCORK and is devised by architect and artist Paul Sullivan and Becky Shaw. It
will basically result in every fine art graduating student in Cork’s Crawford College of
Art, getting two reviews of their final year show from critics, writers and arts
administrators in Cork. They want to expose how criticism is dished out, who gets
reviewed and why and make transparent the views of the movers and shakers within
Cork and the international art world, which are often not transparent. But they also
want to make transparent the difficult position those making judgments are put in as
they open themselves us to judgment by the reviewed!
James: I think these problems are hard in school and they’re hard in this kind of
setting but I think the place where they’re really the toughest is when you’re out there
in the world as an established artist and you have a bunch of friends who like you.
That can be the most dangerous thing of all, because then you just get a lot of pats
on the shoulder. That can be seriously dangerous, asphyxiating even.
Maud: I got out of the country because I felt that everything was much too
confirming. might this word be confining?
Sheila Fleming: The development of that now is the amount of open submission
shows around the country even compared to ten years ago. I think we are in a
developmental stage here, there are so many opportunities; perhaps the writing and
the critical environment will come after.
James: Perhaps, but the art world is also full of really overly short notices and overly
polite social gatherings. The politeness phenomenon extends to newspapers too. In
a country this size no one wants to write something nasty and wake up the next
morning and be in the same place.
Anyway, number three is a distinction between people who report thoughts after
they’ve thought them up and people who discover their thoughts while they’re
talking. This latter is a really common type. Art is confusing so its excusable, but
there are a lot of people out there who have an invisible microphone in front of them
and will just talk and talk and talk. The problem being they are discovering what they
think while they’re talking, which is desperately confusing from a student’s point of
view. It’s much better from the artist’s point of view if you get your friend or your
teacher to just be quiet for ten minutes and only then say something, in order to
minimise the chances that they’re discovering their own thoughts while they’re
speaking. That’s a basic thing about any kind of human interaction, but I think with
art it’s exacerbated because new art is meant to be a bit confusing so it can make
talk about it doubly confusing.
The fourth reason critiques can be difficult is that teachers make their own art works
which are different from yours, which means, when it comes right down to it, that the
teacher doesn’t like your art work because if they did they would have made it. So
there is a negative judgment right there to begin with, and this of course goes for
anybody who sees anybody else’s work who is themselves an artist. Would read
better as who are themselves artists
Rory Mullins: One of the things that came up in the Static workshop was people
realising that we all had one student to review and some people went into the room
and immediately went ‘I hate this, I can’t review it.’ They realised they were incapable
of even seeing what was there, so not even getting to the stage of critiquing it.
Maud: I did teacher training, and you do educational psychology, psychology of
attention and retention and all that business, and you’re supposedly taught how not
to be prejudiced. When you’re teaching children you have got to be alert to their
individual minds. They are all so incredibly different. If you don’t make a leap into
their unknown you can damage them, because you pre-determine and pre-judge
where they’re going to go, developmentally. It’s a little bit like that with art.
James: There’s a brilliant essay called Boutique Multiculturalism (Ed: it’s an essay,
and essays are usually not italicized; they’re usually in quotation marks. Even if this
is house style, please change it — thanks.) by the literary theorist Stanley Fish. His
claim is that none of us is a multi-culturalist, that in other words, none of us is really a
pluralist who’s willing to like everything else. The example he gives is the fatwa
against Salman Rushdie. He says imagine you’re an Islamist who’s spent their entire
life studying Islamic culture and you’re really deeply sympathetic with it and then you
read about the fatwa, well, you’re not gonna pick up a gun and go out and try to find
Salman Rushdie. Why not? Because you’ve drawn a line there somewhere, and
what Fish says is that everybody has a line like that, and therefore no one is what he
calls a strong multi-culturalist; everybody is a boutique multi-culturalist just picking
and choosing a nice little bouquet for yourself which counts for you as your
tolerance. It’s a very provocative, cynical thesis but the parallel in the art world is a
The fifth reason is that teachers make very idiosyncratic pronouncements. And here I
would also take a bit of theory from Stanley Fish. Fish is famous in literary criticism
because he invented what’s called ‘reader response criticism’. He wrote a book
arguing that there is no text in the class. Reader response criticism means that a text
has no intrinsic properties but it is what people bring to it. In Fish’s way of thinking,
every artwork has value because there is what he calls an interpretive community, a
group of people who’ve more or less agreed on what its values are. But those
interpretive communities can shift and change and nothing intrinsically belonging to
the artwork can ever control what people say about it. Generations can come and go
and people can say anything about anything that they want. Even when artwork
seems to be eternal, take Rembrandt, Rembrandt only has the qualities he seems to
because the interpretive community is so enormous. It consists of two billion people
over three centuries who love Rembrandt for the same kinds of reasons. But when
you come to contemporary art, interpretive communities are really small – and this is
something that may come up in Gayatri Spivak’s lecture too, dimensions of
democracy hinge on this – the art-world is of course small and within it you have
people doing problematic practices that are not understood by the whole art world.
And they are not only small but also evanescent; people change, a group can
change its judgment about a work very quickly, month-to-month, minute-to-minute.
So reason number five that art critiques are hard to understand is because you can’t
tell, unless the person is wearing a badge, what interpretive community they
represent; are they just representing their one psychotic self or are they representing
an interpretive community that have followed geometric abstraction since the
twenties, or something more stable still?
Jan: You can check. You read art criticism; you are a clever person. You should be
able to understand where they are coming from. You are playing the role of the naive
cynic and you’re not. If you are interested you can find out.
James: The kind of thing that I would be claiming here is that in the world of
contemporary art you are in a place which is particularly treacherous in terms of
interpretive communities. If you go to the Louvre and you stand in that crowd of
people that are looking at the Mona Lisa, you’re pretty safe in interpreting the oohs
and aahs. The kind of thing that I would be arguing is that this is particularly
treacherous in contemporary art where things shift and change very quickly and
groups are often very small and hard to check. So I’m saying, it’s relative. I’m not
claiming the social contract is negated.
Daniel Jewesbury: From what I remember of reading Fish, he maintains that any
principled position is ultimately bogus and that it is a kind of self-delusion anyway.
Are you going along with that? Your use of the word ‘idiosyncratic’ suggests that
anybody who speaks from a certain position is, by virtue of that position, bogus or
James: I wasn’t trying to say that exactly, and I wasn’t using that part of Fish’s
interest. I was thinking more of sources of consensus among people hence the Mona
Lisa effect. I also feel funny about saying that anything is bogus, because you can be
a really interesting interpretive community of one, your principles can be quite ironclad
as it were. Its more a matter of how the social contract is operating when you’re
in a group that is shifting and changing.
Sheila Fleming: I have to say that as a student, reading anything published or
someone else’s writing gives you the opportunity to check your own eye and
knowledge. Sometimes even an Aidan Dunne (art reviewer for the Irish Times) article
helps, even though it might not be as fulsome, and he has to write for a certain public
and in a certain kind of way.
James: One of the biggest disagreements we had at the Ballyvaughan “States of Art
Criticism” roundtable — that is, the even that will be the core of the book of that
name, which is vol. 5 in the series The Art Seminar, which I am editing at UCC —
does this need a note to explain what it was? was between people like me who
wanted to think of all kinds of newspaper art criticism along with ‘academic criticism,’
and people on the other hand who did not want to include the Aidan Dunnes of the
world, because it isn’t serious art criticism. Some people just want to say that that is
different from what they would count as serious criticism, but perhaps its more a
matter of having a text there that you can think about, it’s relative. This was a
disagreement that we didn’t resolve.
The sixth reason is that critiques are very emotional. The critique is not a situation
where you can be detached, because the artist, of course, is very close to their work.
It struck me a couple of years ago that one of the ways you could think about a
critique is that it’s like a seduction. The student is trying to get their artwork to be
seductive, but you also don’t really want that to happen because what you want to do
is get a certain amount of feedback. You want to learn something. It is always nice to
sell a work, but what you’re really looking for then is an arc of immediate enthusiastic
acceptance followed by an amicable separation.
The seventh reason critiques can be difficult is that they are like a number of other
conversations with which they can be conflated or confused. For example, a critique
can be like an exercise in translation, because you’re trying to translate something
visual into something that is verbal. You’re trying to translate the critique from the
way you talk into the way the person is talking, so it can be like a conversation
between two people who are not fluent in the different languages each other (are) is
speaking. There have been some things written about critiques as story-telling. The
problem with that is that at some point you usually want there to be some truth in that
the critique is not just a story-telling time, it’s also a situation in which you want to be
getting across something which is true.
I think my favourite of these is that critiques are often a lot like legal proceedings,
because you set out the evidence that your work is really good, that its ‘not guilty’; if
you have someone who’s not convinced by that you have to argue your case. The
difference, of course, is that the artwork doesn’t get freed or executed at the end of
the critique, its more like the way legal proceedings take place in Kafka – they just go
on and on and on and there’s endless evidence and there’s endless ways to argue.
Jan: What I am trying to say is that when I work as an art critic, the situation I find
myself in is mediating between a subjective case or a totally subjective story and the
relative objectivity of the public. That is exactly how Kant describes aesthetic
judgment, in his Critique of Judgement. On the one hand, every artist has some
subjective story to tell and, on the other, an objective audience or press; some kind
of language in which to make themselves understood, and in that language you can
always trace the more or less objective steps that someone is taking toward that
end. In that language you are always mediating between the subjective which is the
story the objectivity that comes through the story and which is told, and the audience
that is addressed. So the problem that I have is that I see all the problems you are
describing but I see them as a task and as a challenge.
James: I’m not sure if I would disagree with that. The point I make in the book is that
art critiques are actually absolutely wonderful because they’re ninety-nine percent
Jan: It’s not ninety-nine percent irrational. It’s very, very rational.
James: Well there we might disagree.
Jan: I would say it’s just different from official rationality, that it is a constructive form
of rationality. In every artwork you go from A to B to C, and maybe in a very
idiosyncratic way, but if you do analysis of that kind, you can perhaps understand
why someone has taken certain steps. You can describe that, and, of course, in
describing, someone else can judge whether your description makes sense or not.
James: I think you are an interesting person because you are very idealistic and
Jan: No. I am totally pragmatic.
James: But your pragmatism is very optimistic because the art world would often be
considered a place where these kinds of encounters, adjudications, comparisons or
references to interpretive communities never take place. A lot of people would say,
you may have a review in frieze and another one in Parkett, but where is the person
who is gathering them together to see how they fit into any coherent set of claims? A
lot of people would say that the art world doesn’t have those people.
Jan: Every reader can check.
James: They can, but it doesn’t happen in print. A lot of people would say that the art
world speaks in many, many voices and defers this moment.
I think this is part of an interesting but different conversation. I don’t know many
critics who, for example, take newspaper art criticism seriously. The historians who
do this kind of work don’t usually bother with newspaper art criticism. These acts of
adjudication don’t take place. frieze does not get quoted in footnotes by art
historians. That’s the thing. There isn’t this moment. So I am more cynical. And I am
happy with the state in criticism where these conversations are separated, but it
means I cannot appeal to the notion that there are these moments where people can
check to see how this discourse fits with this discourse.
Jan: I strongly believe that. For me it is a necessary fiction to maintain some
intellectual responsibility. It is not idealist. I think it is politically pragmatic. The
biggest contradiction that you face as an art critic is that your work is illegitimate, but
also that it is standing fast, calling out to be answered and criticised. That’s what’s so
exciting. On the one hand you feel it is necessary to write this but on the other hand
you feel you have to prove it. There is always the risk that you might write complete
nonsense. You can never answer that, you have to keep on writing, but there are
readers who can test that.
James: I wouldn’t disagree with anything up to the last phrase. Anyway, number
eight is that teachers waste a lot of time usually giving technical advice. In my
experience more conservative art schools would be almost all technical advice about
glazes or whatever it is in your medium. On the other hand, in art academies and art
institutions with an international presence, especially at the higher levels, there can
be a reticence on the part of instructors to give any technical advice. The assumption
being that once you get to a certain point as an artist whatever technical faults you
might have are no longer to be understood as faults. Both sides of the spectrum lead
to problems, and it’s inherently a difficult subject because there isn’t a plausible
discourse that can link the technical with the other than technical.
Number nine is that some teachers are adjudicative and others descriptive. Most
teachers are adjudicative, which means they are out there to judge. Other teachers,
who are rare but really interesting, are descriptive; their purpose in life is to describe
the work as eloquently as they can, and ask you questions without incorporating
explicit judgments. Usually these two don’t mingle very much.
The tenth is that your presence, as the artist, can be confusing to the people who are
writing and speaking and in art schools it’s a common assignment that when you get
a critique you’re meant to say something first. I think that a good way to think about
this problem is as something that goes back to German Romanticism: the idea that
the point of an Art Academy in the end is to find the student’s expressive potential as
The eleventh and last point that makes critiques difficult is that artworks are
unoriginal. The problem here is that that a lot of the rhetoric of the art world is geared
up to praise things that are original. It’s very hard to find words to praise ‘average
Rory: How many of the flaws would be substantive of the whole process or
endeavour of critiquing?
James: Some of these are pretty inherent. Maybe the first one, the kinds of
judgments that people say are inherent.
Jan: One thing I don’t completely understand are the implications of what you are
saying, what do you want, why are you stating what you are saying?
James: Reviewers of my book said that I should be claiming there are actual fixes,
ways to fix critique and turn it into something else. In other words, some of these
things that turn around and seem to be positive recommendations read as if I was
trying to diagnose a problem; that this is what we should be doing. But I didn’t do any
of that, because as far as I am concerned my interest is simply that these things are
so challenging. They are far more interesting, as it were, than a conversation in a
science lab about fixing a piece of equipment, or indeed any kind of conversation
that is systematic. The lack of system and the unpredictability of it, I think this is
Jan: I would describe you as a professor who tries to prove to the world that he
doesn’t have to know (what) that he is doing. (Laughter) del Suggest keep ‘what’
and keep (laughter) or [laughing]
James: I like that. For if were going to talk about art then none of us are going to be
in control much of the time. If you were to succeed miraculously in clearing all this up
I think it would be much less interesting.